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I. INTRODUCTION 
On January 12, 2008, Brian K. Bates, an Ohio citizen, was seriously injured in a 
car accident due to the negligence of another driver.1 Because Bates was unable to 
pay all of the $185,000 worth of his medical expenses, he relied upon Medicaid to 
pay about $67,245.37 on his behalf.2 Following his accident, Bates filed a claim with 
a value of over $500,000 against the negligent driver.3 The parties, however, 
                                                           
 1 Encompass Indem. Co. v. Bates, No. 11AP-1010, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3946, at *1 
(Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2012). 
 2 Id.  
 3 Id. at *6. 
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eventually agreed to settle Bates’ claim for $100,000—twenty percent of the claim’s 
true value.4 After attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses were deducted from Bates’ 
settlement, only $62,000 remained, and from this remaining $62,000, Ohio’s 
Medicaid agency, the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS), then 
sought reimbursement for the medical payments it made on Bates’ behalf.5 
Pursuant to Ohio’s Medicaid third party liability statute, which requires ODJFS 
to recover from a Medicaid recipient’s tort settlement with a liable third party the 
lesser of all that it paid on the recipient’s behalf or fifty percent of the recipient’s 
total settlement value,6 ODJFS claimed fifty percent7 ($31,000) of Bates’ remaining 
$62,000 settlement.8 Bates, however, argued that pursuant to a recent Supreme Court 
decision, Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn,9 ODJFS 
should only have been entitled to recover twenty percent of his remaining settlement 
($13,449.07)10 because he settled his claim for twenty percent of its true value.11  
If Bates’ settlement was specifically allocated for medical expenses, his 
argument would have been upheld under the Ahlborn ruling, leaving him with a 
remaining settlement of $48,550.93.12 Because his settlement was not specifically 
allocated for medical expenses, however, the Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals 
affirmed ODJFS’ recovery under the Ohio Medicaid reimbursement statute, leaving 
Bates with a remaining settlement of only $31,000 from a claim worth over 
$500,000.13 As Bates received a full $17,550.93 less than he would have if his 
settlement was allocated for medical expenses, this result is fundamentally unfair. 
However, not only is this result unfair to Bates, it is also fundamentally unfair to 
many other Ohio Medicaid recipients whose settlements are likewise not allocated 
for medical expenses. This inequity is even more apparent when considering the fact 
that there are many reasons why settlements often are not allocated. For instance, 
parties may wish to forgo allocation in an attempt to settle their cases as fast as 
possible so that the injured party can have access to money for his care and 
rehabilitation, or alternatively, parties may not be able or willing to come to an 
allocation agreement that is palatable to all involved. Thus, the tendency has been for 
                                                           
 4 Id. at *2, *6. 
 5 Id. at *2. ODJFS sought reimbursement pursuant to the federal Medicaid third party 
liability laws discussed infra Part II.A.  
 6 Statutory schemes that limit state Medicaid agencies’ recovery to a certain percentage of 
Medicaid recipients’ settlements are referred to as statutory caps throughout this Note.  
 7 ODJFS claimed fifty percent of the settlement because fifty percent ($31,000) was less 
than the total amount ODJFS paid on Bates’ behalf ($67,245.37).  
 8 Bates, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3946, at *2.  
 9 Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006). 
 10 Twenty percent of $67,245.37, the total amount ODJFS paid on Bates’ behalf, is 
$13,449.07.  
 11 Bates, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3946, at *6.  
 12 The Ahlborn ruling is discussed in great detail in infra Part II.B.  
 13 Bates, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3946, at *2-3.  
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parties to come to a settlement agreement that is unallocated,14 which ultimately 
results in injured parties receiving significantly less than that to which they would 
have received if their settlements were allocated.   
Not only is this statutory scheme fundamentally unfair to Ohio Medicaid 
recipients, it also creates a situation in which compliance with the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Ahlborn is impossible to ensure.15 Accordingly, this Note argues that 
Ohio’s Medicaid third party liability statute must either be invalidated by the Ohio 
Supreme Court or repealed by the Ohio General Assembly. This Note then goes on 
to argue that the Ohio General Assembly must amend its Medicaid third party 
liability statute to require settlement allocation before ODJFS can recover the 
medical payments it made on behalf of Ohio Medicaid recipients. Finally, this Note 
argues that Ohio should also amend its Medicaid third party liability statute to 
require that the parties come to an allocation agreement themselves or, if that proves 
impossible, to require a judicial allocation hearing to so allocate. 
Part II of this Note discusses the federal Medicaid program and state Medicaid 
programs’ right to recover medical expenses paid on behalf of Medicaid recipients 
when those recipients receive settlements from liable third parties. Part II also 
discusses the Supreme Court’s decision in Ahlborn and how it affects states’ 
recovery rights under federal Medicaid and anti-lien law. Finally, Part II discusses 
Ohio’s Medicaid third party liability statute and its treatment by the Ohio Tenth 
District Court of Appeals.  
Part III of this Note argues that the Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals 
wrongly upheld Ohio’s Medicaid third party liability statute and offers reasons for 
that contention. Part III also argues that to ensure compliance with the federal anti-
lien provisions as interpreted by Ahlborn, the Ohio Medicaid third party liability 
statute must be amended to require allocation of unallocated settlements before 
ODJFS can claim the right to any portion of Ohio Medicaid recipients’ settlements. 
Finally, Part III provides case law, statutory, and policy support for the contention 
that such allocation is necessary.  
Part IV outlines the various ways by which ODJFS’ interests can be protected in 
the settlement process, as well as the various ways by which Medicaid recipients’ 
settlements can be allocated. This Note then concludes by arguing that the best way 
to allocate Ohio Medicaid recipients’ settlements in light of Ahlborn is to require the 
parties to come to an allocation agreement on their own, and if such allocation 
proves impossible, to have the court so allocate following a hearing where all 
interested parties have a chance to present their ideas of a fair allocation.  
II. MEDICAID REIMBURSEMENT LAW POST-AHLBORN 
The federal Medicaid program was created to ensure that all Americans, even the 
poor, receive medical care. This section examines the federal and state Medicaid 
programs and discusses how these programs are entitled to reimbursement for 
medical expenses paid on behalf of Medicaid recipients when a third party is held 
liable for those medical expenses. This section further discusses the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Ahlborn and how this decision has shaped state Medicaid reimbursement 
                                                           
 14 Robert B. Pearlman, Ahlborn, Jackson and the Three Most Important Words in 
Personal Injury Practice, S.C. LAWYER, Jan. 21, 2010, at 18, 20. 
 15 This contention will be further discussed infra Part III.  
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law. Finally, this section focuses on Ohio’s Medicaid third party liability law, as well 
as the Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals’ interpretation of that law.  
A. The Federal Medicaid Program 
The federal Medicaid program was created in 1965 with the enactment of Title 
XIX of the Social Security Act.16 This program, which is jointly financed and 
administered by the federal government17 and the states,18 is the largest source of 
funding for medical and health-related services in America.19 State participation in 
the federal Medicaid program is not mandatory; however, because the federal 
Government pays between 50% and 83%20 of the costs that states incur for patient 
care, every state has opted to participate.21 To receive this federal funding, each state 
must establish a single agency to administer the plan22 and comply with federal 
statutory requirements governing Medicaid administration.23 
1. Third Party Liability Recovery Provisions 
While Medicaid was intended “to provide for the medical needs of the poorest 
Americans,”24 Congress did not intend for the Program to act as an insurance 
                                                           
 16 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396-1396v (West 2013). 
 17 The program is administered on the federal level by the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS): Overview, 
ALLGOV.COM (2012), http://www.allgov.com/departments/department-of-health-and-human-
services/centers-for-medicare-medicaid-services-cms?agencyid=7395. 
 18 See Ohio Medicaid Statistics, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-
CHIP-Program-Information/By-State/ohio.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2012) (“Each state 
establishes and administers its own Medicaid program and determines the type, amount, 
duration, and scope of services covered within broad Federal guidelines.”). 
 19 Kathleen Sebelius, HHS: What We Do, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS, 
http://www.hhs.gov/about/whatwedo.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2013). Medicaid provides for 
over fifty million Americans. Id.  
 20 See Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 275 n.4 (2006) 
(“The exact percentage of the federal contribution is calculated pursuant to a formula keyed to 
each State’s per capita income.”).  
 21 Id. at 275.  
 22 42 U.S.C.A § 1396a(5) (West 2012) (“A state plan for medical assistance must—either 
provide for the establishment or designation of a single State agency to administer or to 
supervise the administration of the plan; or provide for the establishment or designation of a 
single State agency to administer or to supervise the administration of the plan.”). 
 23 See Ohio Medicaid Basics 2011, HEALTH POLICY INST. OF OHIO, (May 2011), 
http://a5e8c023c8899218225edfa4b02e4d9734e01a28.gripelements.com/pdf/publications/basi
cs2011.pdf (“Ohio’s Medicaid program includes services mandated by the federal government 
plus optional services the state chooses to provide. Ohio has some discretion to vary the 
services it covers but, in all cases, the services must be ‘sufficient in amount, duration, and 
scope to reasonably achieve its purpose,’ according to federal regulations (42 C.F.R. § 
440.230).”).  
 24 Suzanne G. Clark, Case Note, An Accident Waiting to Happen: Arkansas Department of 
Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn Exposes Inequities in Medical Benefits Legislation, 60 
ARK. L. REV. 533, 539 (2007). In Ohio, “Medicaid covers several categories of low-income 
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provider.25 Rather, Congress intended for Medicaid to be the payer of last resort of 
recipients’ medical expenses.26 Accordingly, as a condition for participation in the 
federal Medicaid program, § 1396a(25)(A) of the Social Security Act requires states 
to “take all reasonable measures to ascertain the legal liability of third parties . . . to 
pay for care and services available under the plan.”27 Section 1396a(25)(B) then 
requires states to seek reimbursement from such liable third parties.28 
2. Third Party Liability Assignment Provisions 
Pursuant to this reimbursement requirement, if a third party is found liable for 
Medicaid recipients’ medical expenses, § 1396a(25)(H) stipulates that states must 
enact laws under which they are considered to have acquired the recipients’ rights to 
any settlements between the recipients and the liable third parties as reimbursement 
for medical payments the states made on the recipients’ behalf.29 Similarly, § 
1396k(a)(1) requires recipients, “as a condition of eligibility for medical assistance,” 
to assign to their state all of their rights to such settlements.30  
                                                           
Americans, including children, parents, pregnant women, seniors, and certain people with 
disabilities.” HEALTH POLICY INST. OF OHIO, OHIO MEDICAID BASICS 2011 (May 2011), 
available at http:// 
a5e8c023c8899218225edfa4b02e4d9734e01a28.gripelements.com/pdf/publications/basics201
1_execsummary.pdf. 
 25 See Allen N. Trask, III, Comment, Orders from on High: The Current Struggle over 
Medicaid Third Party Recovery Between North Carolina and the Supreme Court of the United 
States, 30 CAMPBELL L. REV. 471, 473 (2008) (“Medicaid was intended to provide assistance 
to the poor, but it was not intended to act as an insurance policy.”). 
 26 Trask, supra note 25, at 473.  
 27 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(25)(A) (West 2012).  
 28 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(25)(B) (West 2012) (“A State plan for medical assistance must 
provide that in any case where such a legal liability is found to exist after medical assistance 
has been made available on behalf of the individual and where the amount of reimbursement 
the State can reasonably expect to recover exceeds the costs of such recovery, the State or 
local agency will seek reimbursement for such assistance to the extent of such legal 
liability.”). 
 29 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(25)(H) (West 2012) (“A State plan for medical assistance must 
provide, that to the extent that payment has been made under the State plan for medical 
assistance in any case where a third party has a legal liability to make payment for such 
assistance, the State has in effect laws under which, to the extent that payment has been made 
under the State plan for medical assistance for health care items or services furnished to an 
individual, the State is considered to have acquired the rights of such individual to payment by 
any other party for such health care items or services.”).  
 30 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396k(a)(1)(A) (West 2012) (“For the purpose of assisting in the 
collection of medical support payments and other payments for medical care owed to 
recipients of medical assistance under the State plan approved under [42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et 
seq.], a State plan for medical assistance shall (1) provide that, as a condition of eligibility for 
medical assistance under the State plan to an individual who has the legal capacity to execute 
an assignment for himself, the individual is required—(A) to assign the State any rights, of the 
individual or of any other person who is eligible for medical assistance under [42 U.S.C. §§ 
1396 et seq.] and on whose behalf the individual has the legal authority to execute an 
assignment of such rights, to support (specified as support for the purpose of medical care by a 
court or administrative order) and to payment for medical care from any third party.”).  
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss3/11
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B. The Effect of Ahlborn on State Medicaid Reimbursement Statutes 
Initially, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) “interpreted 
the[se] Medicaid third party liability provisions to authorize [s]tates to pass laws 
permitting full recovery of Medicaid assistance payments from third party liability 
settlements, regardless of how [or if] the parties allocated the settlement.”31 
However, in Ahlborn, the seminal decision on these Medicaid third party liability 
provisions, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected CMS’ interpretation and held 
that state Medicaid agencies may only recover the limited portion of the settlement 
that actually represents medical expenses.32  
This unanimous decision arose out of a 1996 car accident in which Heidi 
Ahlborn, “then a 19 year old college student and aspiring teacher, suffered severe 
and permanent injuries”33 due to the negligence of two tortfeasors.34 Because her 
“liquid assets were insufficient to pay for her medical care,” Ahlborn was forced to 
rely on Arkansas’ Medicaid program, the Arkansas Department of Human Services 
(ADHS),35 to pay $215,645.30 worth of her medical expenses.36  
In 1997, Ahlborn filed suit against the tortfeasors seeking damages for those 
medical expenses, as well as for “permanent physical injury; future medical 
expenses; past and future pain, suffering, and mental anguish; past loss of earnings 
and working time; and permanent impairment of the ability to earn in the future.”37 
Rather than taking her case to trial, however, Ahlborn settled with the tortfeasors for 
$550,000, one sixth of her original $3,040,708.12 claim.38 Then, pursuant to the 
Arkansas Medicaid third party liability statute, ADHS claimed its right to 
reimbursement from this settlement.39 Accordingly, ADHS asserted a lien40 against 
Ahlborn’s settlement in the amount of $215,645.30—the total amount of medical 
expenses ADHS paid on Ahlborn’s behalf.41  
                                                           
 31 Memorandum from Gale Arden, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & State Operations: Disabled & 
Elderly Health Programs Grp., on State Options for Recovery Against Liab. Settlements in 
light of Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, to All Assoc. Reg’l Adm’rs for Medicaid & 
State Operations (July 3, 2006), available at http://www. 
specialneedsnj.com/article.php?id=20 [hereinafter Arden, Memorandum]. 
 32 Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 282 (2006).  
 33 Id. at 273. Ahlborn “was left brain damaged, unable to complete her college education, 
and incapable of pursuing her chosen career.” Id.  
 34 Id. at 272-73. 
 35 What is Medicaid?, ARK. MEDICAID, https://www.medicaid.state.ar.us/ 
InternetSolution/General/whatis.aspx (last visited Nov. 20, 2012). 
 36 Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 273.  
 37 Id. ADHS was not named as a party in this suit. Id. 
 38 Id. at 274. 
 39 Id.  
 40 Justice Stevens acknowledged that a state’s recovery for medical expenses paid on 
behalf of a Medicaid recipient amounts to a lien on the beneficiary’s settlement. Id. at 286 (“A 
lien is typically imposed on the property of another for payment of a debt owed by that other. . 
. . That the lien is also called an ‘assignment’ does not alter the analysis.”). 
 41 Id. at 274.  
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In reaction to ADHS’ lien against her settlement, Ahlborn filed suit against 
ADHS in 2002, claiming Arkansas’ Medicaid third party liability statute, which 
allowed ADHS to claim the rights to her settlement for the full amount of medical 
expenses paid on her behalf, 42 violated the anti-lien provisions of the Social Security 
Act: §§ 1396p(a)(1) and 1396(a)(18).43 Section 1396p(a)(1) prohibits states from 
imposing liens “against the property44 of any individual prior to [her] death on 
account of medical assistance paid on [her] behalf under the State [Medicaid 
program],”45 and § 1396(a)(18) requires states to comply with § 1396p(a)(1).46  
Ahlborn argued that because the parties stipulated47 that only $35,581.4748 of her 
settlement was designated for medical expenses, ADHS’ claim to the full amount of 
medical expenses paid on her behalf ($215,645.30) violated the anti-lien provisions 
insofar as such a claim “would require depletion of compensation for injuries other 
than past medical expenses.”49 In other words, Ahlborn argued that if ADHS claimed 
the right to more than $35,581.47 of her settlement, it would claim the right to funds 
that were not designated for medical expenses,50 thereby asserting a lien on her 
                                                           
 42 Id. at 277-78 (“‘As a condition of eligibility’ for Medicaid, an applicant ‘shall 
automatically assign his or her right to any settlement, judgment or award which may be 
obtained against any third party to [ADHS] to the full extent of any amount which may be 
paid by Medicaid for the benefit of the applicant.” (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-77-309(a) 
(2001) (repealed 2006)). 
 43 Id. at 274. 
 44 Any assignment to a state of the right to an individual’s settlement funds would be 
considered a lien on the personal property of an individual because settlement funds are 
considered personal property and state assignments of rights to such settlements are 
considered liens. See Martin v. City of Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1, 14 (Minn. 2002) 
(“Essentially, at the time of an accident, the injured party acquires in tort one or more 
[property] rights of action or claims against those responsible for injuries. These rights of 
action or claims can be likened to a ‘bundle of sticks.’” (quoting United States v. Ben-Hur, 2 
F.3d 313, 317-18 (7th Cir. 1994))); see also supra text accompanying note 40.  
 45 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(a)(1) (West 2013).  
 46 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(18) (West 2013) (“A State plan for medical assistance must 
comply with the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p with respect to liens, adjustments and 
recoveries of medical assistance correctly paid.”). 
 47 Originally, Ahlborn’s settlement was unallocated; however, “to facilitate the District 
Court’s resolution of the legal questions presented,” the parties stipulated to the amount in the 
settlement that represented the medical payments ADHS made on Ahlborn’s behalf. Ahlborn, 
547 U.S. at 274. 
 48 Since Ahlborn settled her claim for one-sixth of its true value, the parties stipulated that 
medical expenses in the settlement should be reduced pro rata to $35,581.47, because the 
amount was one-sixth of the $215,645.30 that ADHS paid on Ahlborn’s behalf for medical 
expenses. Id. 
 49 Id.  
 50 Funds not designated for medical expenses in Ahlborn’s settlement included those for 
“permanent physical injury; future medical expenses; past and future pain, suffering, and 
mental anguish; past loss of earnings and working time; and permanent impairment of the 
ability to earn in the future.” Id. at 273. 
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personal property “on account of medical assistance paid on [her] behalf”51 that was 
not excepted by the assignment provisions.52 ADHS, however, argued that the 
Medicaid third party assignment provisions permitted such a claim.53 
Upon review of both arguments, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the 
assignment provisions create an exception to the absolute prohibition of placing liens 
on Medicaid recipients’ settlements on account of medical assistance paid on their 
behalf when third parties are liable for such assistance; 54 however, the Court made 
clear that “the exception carved out by [the anti-lien provisions] is limited to 
payments for medical care. Beyond that, the anti-lien provision[s] appl[y].”55  
The Supreme Court then went on to hold that state Medicaid agencies may only 
recover that limited portion of Medicaid recipients’ settlements that actually 
represents payments for medical care,56 which in Ahlborn’s case, was the portion of 
her settlement that the parties stipulated to representing medical care.,57 To hold 
otherwise, the Court reasoned, would violate the anti-lien provisions because the 
state would then be permitted to take from other categories of damages that are the 
personal property of Medicaid recipients and are not excepted by the assignment 
                                                           
 51 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(a)(1) (West 2013).  
 52 Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 274; see also Martin v. City of Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1, 15 
(Minn. 2002) (“As a condition of receiving medical assistance from a state, a medical 
assistance recipient assigns to the state one stick from that bundle [of sticks]—the specific 
claim to recover medical expenses from those responsible for the injuries. . . . But the 
recipient retains ownership of the remaining sticks in the bundle. . . . To the extent that any 
settlement with the responsible third parties is for this large bundle of sticks (the original tort 
action minus the claim for medical care), the settlement proceeds are the recipient’s personal 
property, and as such are protected by the federal anti-lien provision[s].”). 
 53 Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 285-86.  
 54 Id. at 284 (“To the extent that the forced assignment is expressly authorized by the 
terms of §§ 1396a(a)(25) [sic] and 1396k(a), it is an exception to the anti-lien provision.”). 
 55 Id. at 284-85. 
 56 Id. at 282 (“[The federal third-party liability provisions require an assignment of no 
more than the right to recover that portion of a settlement that represents payments for medical 
care.”). The Supreme Court came to this conclusion after a thorough examination of the 
federal Medicaid and anti-lien provisions, emphasizing the language in those provisions that 
supports the contention that the assignment provisions only authorize assignment of rights to 
damages that represent medical care. Id. at 280 (“Medicaid recipients must, as a condition of 
eligibility, ‘assign the State any rights . . . to payment for medical care from any third party.’” 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396k(a)(1)(A) (2006))); Id. (“[Section] 1396a(a)(25)(B)’s requirement 
that states ‘seek reimbursement for [medical assistance] to the extent of such legal liability’ 
(emphasis added) . . . [refers to], as is evident from the context of the emphasized language, 
‘such legal liability of third parties . . . to pay for care and services available under the plan.’” 
(quoting § 1396a(a)(25)(B) and § 1396a(25)(A), respectively)); Id. at 281 (“[Section 
1396a(a)(25)(H)] makes clear that the State must be assigned ‘the rights of [the recipient] to 
payment by any other party for such health care items or services.’” (quoting § 
1396a(a)(25)(H))). 
 57 In settlements that are allocated, state Medicaid agencies would only be entitled to the 
portion allocated for medical expenses.  
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provisions.58 Therefore, in Ahlborn’s case, because the parties stipulated that 
$35,581.47 was the portion of her settlement that represented medical care, the 
Supreme Court ruled that ADHS could only recover $35,581.47 from her settlement 
as reimbursement for medical payments made on her behalf.59  
While the Supreme Court explicitly ruled that states may recover only the portion 
of a Medicaid recipient’s settlement that represents medical care, the Court was 
silent as to how states should determine that portion when the settlement is 
unallocated and the parties do not stipulate to the amount of that unallocated 
settlement that represents medical care. As such, states have been left on their own to 
create methods of calculating the appropriate amount of reimbursement to which 
they are entitled from unallocated settlements and have accordingly established a 
multitude of varying rules and procedures for that calculation.60  
C. The Ohio Medicaid Third Party Liability Statute 
In Ohio, Revised Code § 5101.58 governs ODJFS’ right to reimbursement, and 
specifically, subdivision (G)(2) establishes the Ohio rule for seeking that 
reimbursement from unallocated settlements. Section 5101.58(A) stipulates that 
“[t]he acceptance of public assistance gives an automatic right of recovery to 
[ODJFS] . . . against the liability of a third party for the cost of medical assistance 
paid on behalf of the [the Medicaid recipient].”61 This statute also entitles ODJFS to 
recover from a Medicaid recipient’s settlement with a liable third party the medical 
payments it made on the recipient’s behalf.62  
                                                           
 58 Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 285; see also Martin v. City of Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1, 15 
(Minn. 2002) (“As a condition of receiving medical assistance from a state, a medical 
assistance recipient assigns to the state one stick from that bundle [of sticks]—the specific 
claim to recover medical expenses from those responsible for the injuries. . . . But the 
recipient retains ownership of the remaining sticks in the bundle. . . . To the extent that any 
settlement with the responsible third parties is for this large bundle of sticks (the original tort 
action minus the claim for medical care), the settlement proceeds are the recipient’s personal 
property, and as such are protected by the federal anti-lien provision.”). 
 59 Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 285.  
 60 See Jospeh D. Juenger, In Light of Ahlborn—Designing State Legislation to Protect the 
Recovery of Medicaid Expenses from Personal Injury Settlements, 35 N. KY. L. REV. 103, 122 
(2008) (“[W]here no allocation of damages is expressly set forth, the States must establish 
rules and procedures in order to ‘seek reimbursement.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(a)(25)(B))). See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Brown v. N.C. Dep’t. of 
Health & Human Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2792 (March 12, 2009) (No. 08-1146), 2009 WL 698514 
[hereinafter Brown Writ]. 
 61 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5101.58(A) (LexisNexis 2013). This section is in compliance 
with 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(25)(A)-(B) (2013) of the federal Medicaid statute discussed supra 
Part II.A.1. 
 62 Id. (“When an action or claim is brought against a third party by a public assistance 
recipient or participant, any payment, settlement or compromise of the action or claim, or any 
court award or judgment, is subject to the recovery right of the department of job and family 
services or county department of job and family services.”). This section was written to 
comply with 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(25)(H) and 1396k(a) of the federal Medicaid statute 
discussed supra Part II.A.2. 
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In response to the Ahlborn decision, the Ohio General Assembly amended § 
5101.58 in 2007 with the addition of subdivision (G)(2).63 Section 5101.58(G)(2) 
permits ODJFS to recover from a Medicaid recipient’s unallocated settlement the 
less all of the medical expenses it paid on the recipient’s behalf or fifty percent of the 
recipient’s total settlement after deducting reasonable attorney’s fees, costs, and 
expenses.64  
D. The Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals’ Interpretation of § 5101.58(G)(2) in 
Encompass Indemnity Co. v. Bates 
Section 5101.58(G)(2)’s fifty percent statutory cap formulation was challenged 
as a violation of the federal anti-lien provisions per Ahlborn in Encompass Indemnity 
Co. v. Bates,65 the case whose factual background was discussed in the Introduction 
of this Note. In Bates, appellant Brian K. Bates’ settlement with the liable driver was 
not specifically allocated for medical expenses; however, because he settled his 
claim for twenty percent of its true value, Bates nonetheless argued that only 
$13,449.07 (twenty percent of the $67,245.37 ODJFS paid on Bates’ behalf) of his 
settlement represented medical expenses.66 As such, Bates argued that “ODJFS may 
not be reimbursed more than 20 percent of the amount it paid towards [his] medical 
bills” without violating the federal anti-lien provisions as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court in Ahlborn.67  
Despite Bates’ argument, the Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed the 
decision of the lower court and decided that compliance with Ahlborn did not require 
such a pro rata reduction in ODJFS’ recovery.68 In so deciding, the court relied upon 
an earlier Medicaid third party liability case, Mulk v. Ohio Department of Job & 
Family Services,69 and held that  
                                                           
 63 Mulk v. Ohio Dep’t of Job & Family Servs., 969 N.E.2d 1254, 1261 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2011).  
 64 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5101.58(G)(2) (LexisNexis 2013) (“Reasonable attorneys' fees, 
not to exceed one-third of the total judgment, award, settlement, or compromise, plus costs 
and other expenses incurred by the recipient or participant in securing the judgment, award, 
settlement, or compromise, shall first be deducted from the total judgment, award, settlement, 
or compromise. After fees, costs, and other expenses are deducted from the total judgment, 
award, settlement, or compromise, the department of job and family services or appropriate 
county department of job and family services shall receive no less than one-half of the 
remaining amount, or the actual amount of medical assistance paid, whichever is less.”). 
 65 Encompass Indem. Co. v. Bates, No. 11AP-1010, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3946 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2012).  
 66 Id. at *6.  
 67 Id.  
 68 Id. at *6-7. 
 69 Mulk v. Ohio Dep’t of Job & Family Servs., 969 N.E.2d 1254, 1261 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2011). In Mulk, after multiple appellants required Medicaid to pay for medical care they 
received as a result of injuries sustained due to the tortious conduct of third parties, appellants 
argued “that the principles established in Ahlborn require[d] a pro rata reduction of [ODJFS’] 
recovery from any judgment or settlement for medical expenses paid to account for attorney’s 
fees and costs.” Id. at 1258-59. Thus, because appellants had a one-third contingency fee 
agreement, which would reduce their settlement by 33%, appellants argued that ODJFS’ 
recovery for medical expenses must be reduced by 33%. Id. at 1259. Appellants argued that if 
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by limiting ODJFS to one-half of the settlement amount remaining after 
deducting attorney’s fees, costs and expenses, or the full amount of the 
medical expenses paid by ODJFS, whichever is less, [§ 5101.58(G)(2)] 
address[es] the concern raised in Ahlborn—that reimbursement not go 
beyond an amount representing payments for medical care.70 
The Tenth District justified this holding based on the fact that “[§ 5101.58(G)(2)] 
is structured to ensure that [ODJFS] will take no more than half of the remaining 
recovery, thereby ensuring that the injured party will retain a portion of the judgment 
or settlement to compensate for other categories of damages.”71 Thus, the court 
determined that “[t]he General Assembly [] created a valid method to fulfill its 
obligations under [Ahlborn] and to preserve an injured party’s recovery of other 
categories of damages.”72  
As of today, no appeal has yet been made in Bates, and the Supreme Courts of 
the United States and Ohio have refused to hear further appeals in Mulk.73 Despite its 
being challenged, therefore, § 5101.58(G)(2) remains the current Medicaid third 
party liability law in the State of Ohio.  
III. TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH AHLBORN, § 5101.58(G)(2) MUST BE 
INVALIDATED OR REPEALED AND § 5101.58 MUST BE AMENDED TO REQUIRE 
ALLOCATION OF UNALLOCATED SETTLEMENTS BEFORE ODJFS MAY RECOVER  
Though § 5101.58(G)(2) remains the third party liability law in the State of Ohio, 
this section will argue that either the Ohio Supreme Court must invalidate it or, in 
the alternative, the Ohio General Assembly must repeal it. This section further 
discusses how Bates was wrongly decided and argues that to ensure compliance with 
Ahlborn, § 5101.58 must be amended to require the allocation of unallocated 
settlements before ODJFS may recover the medical expenses it paid on behalf of 
Medicaid recipients. Finally, this section provides case law, statutory, and policy 
support for the contention that allocation is necessary.  
                                                           
the recovery was not so reduced, it would “‘dip into’ the portion of the judgment or settlement 
compensating for other forms of damages, such as lost wages or pain and suffering, in order to 
satisfy their attorney’s fees and costs,” and would therefore violate the anti-lien provisions. Id. 
The court, however, determined that because the recipients’ settlements were not allocated, § 
5101.58(G)(2) created a valid method of reimbursement that complied with Ahlborn. Id. The 
court reasoned that § 5101.58(G)(2) complied with Ahlborn because it provided for the 
payment of attorney’s fees, while ensuring that “the injured party w[ould] retain a portion of 
the . . . settlement to compensate for other categories of damages,” as it ensured that ODJFS 
would take no more than half of the entire settlement. Id.  
 70 Bates, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3946, at *12-13. 
 71 Id. at *13 (quoting Mulk, 969 N.E.2d at 1259). 
 72 Id. (quoting Mulk, 969 N.E.2d at 1264). 
 73 The Ohio Supreme Court refused to hear a discretionary appeal for Mulk. Mulk, 963 
N.E.2d 824 (Ohio 2011). The United States Supreme Court also denied certiorari. Mulk, 133 
S. Ct. 242 (2012). 
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A. The Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals’ Decision in Mulk and Bates are 
Contrary to the Principles Established in Ahlborn and to Principles of Justice  
While the Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals refused to invalidate § 
5101.58(G)(2), this sub-section demonstrates that the court should have done so for 
multiple reasons. First of all, under § 5101.58(G)(2), compliance with the anti-lien 
provisions as interpreted by Ahlborn is impossible to ensure and creates the likely 
possibility that a recovery by ODJFS will in fact violate the federal anti-lien 
provisions. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Ahlborn simply does not 
support the Tenth District’s justification for upholding § 5101.58(G)(2). 
1. Compliance With the Federal Anti-Lien Provisions as Interpreted by Ahlborn is 
Impossible to Ensure Under § 5101.58(G)(2)’s Statutory Scheme  
 In Ahlborn, the Supreme Court was abundantly clear that “the federal third-party 
liability provisions require an assignment of no more than the right to recover the 
portion of a settlement that represents payments for medical care.”74 Under § 
5101.58(G)(2), however, compliance with this rule is impossible to ensure because 
no consideration is actually given to the amount in the settlement that actually 
represents payments for medical care. Rather, the fifty percent cap creates an 
unjustified and unverified presumption that the parties intended either the full value 
of the amount ODJFS paid on the recipient’s behalf or fifty percent of the recipient’s 
total settlement minus fees and costs to represent payments for medical care.75 As is 
evident from the plight of Bates, as well as the plights of the appellants in Mulk, 
however, this presumption does not always reflect the true intentions of Medicaid 
recipients, many of whom believe the medical expenses reflected in their settlements 
are limited pro rata by the percent by which they settled their claim. 76 Therefore, 
because § 5101.58(G)(2) fails to ensure, as Ahlborn requires, that ODJFS’ recovery 
is properly limited to the portion of a settlement that actually represents payments for 
medical care, the Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals should have invalidated it.  
2. Section 5101.58(G)(2) Creates the Likely Possibility that ODJFS’ Recovery Will 
Violate the Federal Anti-Lien Provisions 
The Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals should not only have invalidated § 
5101.58(G)(2) because it fails to ensure that ODJFS’ recovery is properly limited to 
medical expenses, but it also should have invalidated § 5101.58(G)(2) because it 
creates the likely possibility that an ODJFS recovery will actually violate federal 
anti-lien provisions. In Ahlborn, the Supreme Court determined that “the federal 
Medicaid anti-lien [provisions] allow a narrow exception for liens that are limited to 
                                                           
 74 Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 282 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 75 See Wos v. E.M.A., 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1399 (2013) (In discussing North Carolina’s non-
rebuttable one-third statutory cap formulation, the Court noted, “[t]he problem is not that it is 
an unreasonable approximation in all cases. In some cases, it may well be a fair estimate. But 
the State provides no evidence to substantiate its claim that the one-third allocation is 
reasonable in the mine run of cases. Nor does the law provide a mechanism for determining 
whether it is a reasonable approximation in any particular case.”). 
 76 See supra text accompanying notes 68-69, 71.  
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recoveries only for medical expenses.”77 A state statute that authorizes recovery of 
more than medical expenses thus violates the anti-lien provisions because that 
recovery would be a lien on the personal property78 of a Medicaid recipient that was 
not excepted by the third party assignment provisions.79  
Under § 5101.58(G)(2), the likelihood of such a violation of the federal anti-lien 
provisions arises.80 In fact, § 5101.58(G)(2) will always violate the anti-lien 
provisions when, as was the case in Bates and Mulk, the amount paid by ODJFS for 
medical services exceeds the amount in the settlement that the parties believed to 
represent medical expenses, but is less than one half of the total settlement.81 In such 
a case, ODJFS’ recovery encroaches upon other categories of damages, which 
Ahlborn specifically forbids.82  
Moreover, such a case likely violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution as well. Under the Supremacy Clause, “[w]here a state and federal law 
‘directly conflict,’ state law must give way.”83 Because the State of Ohio’s 
§ 5101.58(G)(2) creates the likelihood of directly conflicting with the anti-lien 
provisions of the federal Social Security statute, the Tenth District Court of Appeals 
should have invalidated because it likely violates the Supremacy Clause as well.  
3. The Supreme Court’s Reasoning in Ahlborn does not support the Ohio Tenth 
District Court of Appeals’ Justification for Upholding § 5101.58(G)(2) 
The Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals’ justification for upholding 
§ 5101.58(G)(2)—that it comports with Ahlborn because it guarantees that Medicaid 
recipients will receive at least some portion of the settlement as compensation for 
other categories of damages—is also not supported by the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Ahlborn. In Ahlborn, the Supreme Court’s held not that Medicaid recipients must 
maintain some compensation for other categories of damages when state Medicaid 
agencies seek reimbursement for medical payments. Rather, the Supreme Court’s 
holding was that a state Medicaid agency’s recovery violates the federal anti-lien 
                                                           
 77 In re E.B., 729 S.E.2d 270, 289 (W. Va. 2012). This exception is the Medicaid third 
party assignment provisions. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57. 
 78 See Martin v. City of Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2002). 
 79 Supra text accompanying notes 55-57. 
 80 Cf. Elizabeth A. Grymes, Note, A Post-Ahlborn Analysis of the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina’s Decision in Andrews v. Haygood, 2 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 525, 539 (2010). 
 81 Cf. Andrews v. Haygood, 669 S.E.2d 310, 317 (N.C. 2008) (Hudson, J., dissenting) 
(“Application of the [one-third statutory cap formulation] in a case like this one, in which 
there has been no allocation, could allow precisely the result that is explicitly barred by 
Ahlborn. In fact, this would be the outcome with any settlement in which the amount actually 
paid by [the state Medicaid agency] is greater than the amount of the settlement designated for 
medical expenses, but less than the one-third cap.”). 
 82 Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 281 (2006) (“The [Medicaid] 
statute does not sanction an assignment of rights to payment for anything other than medical 
expenses—not lost wages, not pain and suffering, not an inheritance.”). 
 83 PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2577 (2011).  
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provisions unless that recovery is narrowly tailored to the portion of a settlement that 
represents medical expenses.84 
Thus, the Supreme Court was concerned with ensuring that state Medicaid 
agencies recover no more than that to which they are legally entitled from Medicaid 
recipients’ settlements; it was not concerned with ensuring those recipients had at 
least some compensation for damages other than medical expenses. The Ohio Tenth 
District Court of Appeals’ justification for upholding § 5101.58(G)(2), therefore, has 
no merit under Ahlborn.  
B. Section 5101.58(G)(2) Should be Amended to Require the Allocation of 
Unallocated Settlements Before ODJFS May Recover for Medical Expenses 
As discussed above, the Tenth District’s justification for upholding 
§ 5101.58(G)(2) is without merit; under § 5101.58(G)(2) there is no way to ensure 
compliance with Ahlborn; and in fact, § 5101.58(G)(2) creates the likely possibility 
that the anti-lien provisions and United States Supremacy Clause will in fact be 
violated. Accordingly, § 5101.58(G)(2) must either be invalidated by the Ohio 
Supreme Court upon appeal of Bates,85 or in the alternative, be repealed by the Ohio 
General Assembly.  
Additionally, the General Assembly must amend § 5101.58 to require allocation 
of unallocated settlements before ODJFS can claim the right to any portion of Ohio 
Medicaid recipients’ settlements. Requiring such an allocation will ensure 
compliance with the anti-lien provisions as interpreted by Ahlborn by ensuring that 
ODJFS’ recovery will be properly limited to the portion of a settlement that the 
parties actually intended to represent medical expenses. This sub-section provides 
case law, other states’ statutory law, and considerations of fairness and the justice 
system to support the contention that allocation should be required.  
1. Case Law Supports the Contention that § 5101.58 Should be Amended to Require 
Allocation 
The contention that under § 5101.58(G)(2) compliance with Ahlborn is 
impossible to ensure and should therefore be amended to require allocation is 
supported by the fact that the United States Supreme Court, federal courts, and 
various state courts have all invalidated statutory cap formulations both exactly like 
and similar to Ohio’s § 5101.58(G)(2). These courts have held that to ensure 
compliance with Ahlborn, allocation of unallocated settlements should be mandated 
before state Medicaid agencies may recover for medical expenses.  
The Supreme Court so decided in its 2013 decision, Wos vs. E.M.A. ex rel. 
Johnson.86 In Wos, the Supreme Court was called to determine whether North 
Carolina’s one-third statutory cap formulation was compatible with Ahlborn and the 
anti-lien provisions.87 The case came to the Court after a series of state and federal 
opinions relating to the North Carolina statute came into conflict.  
                                                           
 84 Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 292 (“Federal Medicaid law does not authorize ADHS to assert a 
lien on Ahlborn’s settlement in an amount exceeding [that which represents medical 
expenses], and the federal anti-lien provision affirmatively prohibits it from doing so.”).  
 85 Because, as discussed in supra note 73, appellants have exhausted their appeals in Mulk.  
 86 Wos v. E.M.A., 133 S. Ct. 1391 (2013). 
 87 Id. at 1395.  
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The first of these opinions was the North Carolina Supreme Court’s: Andrews v. 
Haygood.88 In Andrews, the court held that North Carolina’s one-third statutory cap 
formulation was “a reasonable method for determining the State’s medical 
reimbursements” when a settlement was not specifically allocated for medical 
reimbursements.89 The United States District Court for the Western District of North 
Carolina, in Armstrong v. Cansler,90 agreed with the North Carolina Supreme 
Court’s decision in Andrews.91 Upon appeal, however, the Fourth Circuit held in 
E.M.A ex rel. Plyler v. Cansler that North Carolina’s one-third statutory cap “fail[s] 
to comply with federal Medicaid law as interpreted by the Supreme Court in 
Ahlborn,”92 stating, “[w]e are not persuaded that a mere ‘reasonable cap’ on a 
settlement satisfies the federal anti-lien law as required by Ahlborn.”93  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court agreed with the Fourth Circuit, holding that “[a]n 
irrebuttable, one-size-fits-all statutory presumption is incompatible with the 
Medicaid Act’s clear mandate that a State may not demand any portion of a 
beneficiary’s tort recovery except the share that is attributable to medical 
expenses.”94 Thus, the Court noted, that in cases where medical expenses were 
neither allocated in the settlement nor stipulated to by the parties,95 an allocation 
must be made to protect “from state demand the portion of a [Medicaid recipient’s] 
tort recovery that the . . . judgment does not attribute to medical expenses.”96  
The Supreme Court of West Virginia likewise determined that West Virginia’s 
one-third statutory cap on recovery violated the anti-lien provisions as interpreted by 
Ahlborn.97 That court held that “the only way for the State to ensure compliance with 
                                                           
 88 Andrews v. Haygood, 669 S.E.2d 310 (N.C. 2008). 
 89 Id. at 314.  
 90 Armstrong v. Cansler, 722 F. Supp. 2d 653 (W.D.N.C. 2013). 
 91 Id.  
 92 E.M.A. v. Cansler, 674 F.3d 290, 312 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 93 Id. at 308. The court determined that allocation of unallocated settlements is required so 
a Medicaid recipient can have an opportunity to rebut the one-third statutory presumption.  
 94 Wos v. E.M.A., 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1399 (2013). 
 95 Id. (“When there has been a judicial finding or approval of an allocation between 
medical and nonmedical damages—in the form of either a jury verdict, court decree, or 
stipulation binding on all parties—that is the end of the matter.”). 
 96 Id. While the court seemed to favor a judge or jury determining such an allocation 
through a mini-trial based on which party would have been “most likely to prevail on the 
claims at trial and how much they reasonably could have expected to receive on each claim if 
successful, in view of damages awarded in comparable tort cases,” the court did note that 
“States have considerable latitude to design administrative and judicial procedures to ensure a 
prompt and fair allocation of damages.” Id. at 1401.  
 97 In re E.B., 729 S.E.2d 270, 291 (W. Va. 2012) (“We are not persuaded by those 
decisions relied upon by [the state Medicaid agency] holding that state Medicaid 
reimbursement statutes comply with Ahlborn simply because they contain ‘reasonable 
statutory caps’ on recovery from unallocated lump sum settlements. These decisions fail to 
require a determination of what portion of a settlement is attributable to medical expenses as 
required by Ahlborn.”). 
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Ahlborn is to provide for a specific allocation of damages in a settlement . . . 
obtained by a recipient of Medicaid assistance.”98 Similarly, in McKinney ex rel. 
Gage v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, the district court purposefully decided to 
forgo applying a fifty percent statutory cap when it was asked to determine the 
portion of an unallocated settlement that was attributable to reimbursement for 
medical expenses.99 The majority of other courts that have interpreted Ahlborn have 
likewise held that allocation of unallocated settlements is required before state 
Medicaid agencies may recover medical expenses paid on behalf of Medicaid 
recipients.100  
Some of the courts that have not mandated allocation of unallocated settlements 
have nonetheless required states to allow Medicaid recipients an opportunity to 
challenge state Medicaid third party liability statutes that provide either for full 
recovery or full recovery subject to some form of a statutory cap. For example, the 
courts in State Department of Health and Welfare v. Hudelson and Price v. Wolford 
held that Medicaid recipients must be given an opportunity to rebut a presumption of 
full recovery upon a showing of evidence that a more limited allocation of damages 
for medical expenses is justified.101 Similarly, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
                                                           
 98 Id. at 295.  
 99 McKinney ex rel. Gage v. Phila. Hous. Auth., No. 07 Civ. 4432, 2010 WL 3364400, at 
*12 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
 100 In re E.B., 229 S.E.2d at 290; see also Bolanos v. Super. Ct., 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 174, 180 
(Ct. App. 2008) (“The fundamental point is that a settlement that does not distinguish between 
past medical expenses and other damages must be allocated between these two classes of 
recoveries. Without such an allocation, the principle set forth in Ahlborn, that the state cannot 
recover for anything other than past medical expenses, cannot be carried into effect.”); Lugo 
v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 819 N.Y.S.2d 892, 896 (App. Div. 2006) (holding that “Ahlborn must 
be read to limit the [state Medicaid agency’s] recoupment to the amount of the settlement 
proceeds allocated to past medical expenses” and that “[t]his Court is [e]mpowered to 
[a]llocate the [s]ettlement [p]roceeds”); Harris v. City of New York, 837 N.Y.S.2d 486, 489 
(App. Div. 2007); Wright v. N.Y. Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, No. 0017444/2001, 2007 WL 
4229216 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007); Sw. Fiduciary, Inc. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment 
Sys. Admin., 249 P.3d 1104, 1111 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (“When the proper allocation of the 
settlement amount to the damage component represented by [the state Medicaid agency] 
payments is disputed, the better course is to seek the intervention of the court.”); I.P. ex rel. 
Cardenas v. Henneberry, 795 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1193-94, 1198 (D. Colo. 2011) (holding that 
Colorado’s Medicaid statute comports with Ahlborn because it allows for state reimbursement 
to “the fullest extent allowed by federal law,” which the court determined was the “federal 
Medicaid laws . . . as interpreted by Ahlborn,” and directed the case to trial to determine the 
portion of the settlement that represents medical expenses (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 25.5-
4-301(5)(a) (2013))). 
 101 See State Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Hudelson, 196 P.3d 905, 912 (Idaho 2008), 
abrogated by Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 265 P.3d 502 (Idaho 2011) (“If no 
[allocation agreement] is reached, [the state Medicaid statute] presumes that the Department is 
entitled to recoup amounts it has paid in benefits on behalf of the recipient up to the amount of 
the settlement or judgment. However, this presumption is subject to being rebutted. The 
Medicaid recipient may present evidence directed toward rebutting the presumption.”); Price 
v. Wolford, 608 F.3d 698, 707 (10th Cir. 2010) (upholding Oklahoma’s Medicaid statute that 
allows for full recovery “unless a more limited allocation of damages to medical expenses is 
shown by clear and convincing evidence.” (quoting OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 
5051.1(D)(1)(d) (West 2012))). 
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upheld Pennsylvania’s former one-third statutory cap102 because, “[p]ursuant to the 
current statutory framework, beneficiaries unhappy with its results may appeal the 
default allocation.”103 After the Supreme Court’s ruling in Wos, a Florida appellate 
court in Agency for Health Care Administration v. Riley likewise held that “a 
plaintiff should be afforded an opportunity to seek the reduction of a Medicaid lien 
amount established by [Florida’s irrebuttable fifty percent statutory cap], with 
evidence, that the lien exceeds the amount recovered for medical expenses.”104  
All of the above cases support the contention that to ensure compliance with 
Ahlborn, state Medicaid third party liability statutes must either provide for the 
allocation of unallocated settlements or provide an opportunity for Medicaid 
beneficiaries to rebut a statutory cap presumption. The Supreme Court’s Wos 
decision and the Florida appellate court’s Riley decision, however, are exceedingly 
persuasive.  
The Wos Court explicitly held that “[a]n irrebuttable, one-size-fits-all statutory 
presumption,” like the irrebuttable fifty percent statutory cap in Ohio, “is 
incompatible with the Medicaid Act’s clear mandate that a State may not demand 
any portion of a beneficiary’s tort recovery except the share that is attributable to 
medical expenses.”105 In that case, the Supreme Court invalidated an irrebuttable 
one-third statutory cap, noting that “[i]f a State arbitrarily may designate one-third of 
any recovery as payment for medical expenses, there is no logical reason why it 
could not designate half, three quarters, or all of a tort recovery in the same way.”106 
Thus, in invalidating North Carolina’s one-third statutory cap, the Supreme Court 
explicitly noted that an irrebuttable fifty percent statutory cap, like Ohio’s § 
5101.58(G)(2), would be a more egregious violation of the federal anti-lien 
provisions. As mentioned above, the Riley stated noted that because of this Wos 
decision, its reasoning in its earlier decision upholding Florida’s irrebuttable fifty 
percent statutory cap107 was “severely undermined,”108 and as such, mandated that 
Florida Medicaid recipients be given the opportunity to rebut that statutory 
presumption.109  
As Ohio’s § 5101.58(G)(2) provides Ohio Medicaid recipients with an 
irrebuttable, one-size-fits-all statutory presumption exactly like Florida’s Medicaid 
third party liability statute that was invalidated under Wos, § 5101.58(G)(2) must be 
amended to ensure compliance with the anti-lien provisions as interpreted by 
                                                           
 102 See infra text accompanying notes 112-13.  
 103 Tristani ex rel. Karnes v. Richman, 652 F.3d 360, 378 (3d Cir. 2011). The court held 
that “in determining what portion of a Medicaid beneficiary’s third-party recovery it may 
claim in reimbursement for Medicaid expenses, the state must have in place procedures that 
allow a dissatisfied beneficiary to challenge the default allocation.” Id.  
 104 Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Riley, 119 So. 3d 514, 516 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2013). 
 105 Wos v. E.M.A., 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1399 (2013). 
 106 Id. at 1398 (emphasis added).  
 107 Russell v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 23 So. 3d 1266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010), 
abrogated by Riley, 119 So.3d 514.  
 108 Riley, 119 So.3d at 515.  
 109 Id. at 516.  
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Ahlborn and Wos. Section 5101.58(G)(2) can be amended to provide a rebuttable 
presumption or to mandate allocation of unallocated settlements; however, the best 
solution is to amend § 5101.58 to require allocation before ODJFS can recover any 
portion of an Ohio Medicaid recipient’s settlement.  
2. Statutory Support for the Contention that § 5101.58 Should be Amended to 
Require Allocation 
The contention that allocation of unallocated settlements is necessary to ensure 
compliance with the Ahlborn principles is also supported by the fact that “[i]n 
reaction to the Court’s ruling in Ahlborn, many states that previously imposed 
statutory caps on Medicaid reimbursement amounts [have since] changed their 
laws.”110 For example, prior to Ahlborn, California law, like § 5101.58(G)(2), 
provided for state recovery of all of the medical expenses paid on a Medicaid 
recipient’s behalf unless those expenses exceeded half the total settlement after 
deducting attorney’s fees.111 The California legislature, however, “quickly 
recognized that a [fifty percent] cap was not in compliance with [the] Court’s ruling 
in Ahlborn, and took prompt steps to amend the statute to eliminate the cap and 
provide for an allocation method.”112 Likewise, Pennsylvania law prior to Ahlborn 
imposed a fifty percent cap on the state’s recovery;113 however, in response to the 
Ahlborn decision, the Pennsylvania legislature amended its Medicaid third party 
liability statute to stipulate that in the case of an unallocated settlement, “the court or 
agency shall allocate the judgment or award between the medical portion and other 
damages.”114  
As the Supreme Court in Wos noted, as of 2013, sixteen States and the District of 
Columbia provide for some type of judicial hearing to allocate unallocated 
settlements before state Medicaid agencies are entitled to recover from any portion 
of a Medicaid recipient’s settlement with a liable third party.115 Of these sixteen 
states, some “have established rebuttable presumptions and adjusted burdens of 
proof to ensure that speculative assessments of a plaintiff’s likely recovery do not 
defeat the State’s right to recover medical costs.”116  
                                                           
 110 Grymes, supra note 80, at 533.  
 111 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14124.78 (West 2005). 
 112 Brown Writ, supra note 62, at 23. The amended § 14124.78 provides for recovery only 
of “that portion of a settlement . . . that represents payment for medical expenses . . . provided 
on behalf of the beneficiary” and stipulates that “all reasonable efforts shall be made to obtain 
the director’s advance agreement to a determination as to what portion of the settlement . . . 
represents payment for medical expenses . . . provided on behalf of the beneficiary.” CAL. 
WELF. & INST. CODE § 14124.78 (West 2005). 
 113 E.M.A v. Cansler, 674 F.3d 290, 309 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 114 62 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1409.1(b)(1)-(2) (West 2012).  
 115 Wos v. E.M.A., 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1401 (2013); see, e.g., D.C. CODE § 4-604(b) (2011); 
305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-22 (West 2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-13-125(2) (West 
2008); MO. ANN. STAT. § 208.215.9 (West 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 167:14-a(IV) 
(LexisNexis 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-66.9 (West 2012). 
 116 Wos, 133 S. Ct. at 1401. 
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For example, the Oklahoma legislature amended its Medicaid third party liability 
statute, which provided for full recovery of medical expenses paid, to allow 
recipients to show “by clear and convincing evidence” that a “more limited 
allocation of damages to medical expenses” is justified.117 Massachusetts likewise 
provides a rebuttable presumption of full reimbursement,118 whereas Hawaii provides 
a rebuttable one-third presumption,119  
These statutes support the proposition that to ensure compliance with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Ahlborn Ohio’s § 5101.58 should be amended to 
require allocation of unallocated settlements. Alternatively, these statutes at the very 
least support the proposition that Ohio Medicaid recipients should be allowed an 
opportunity to rebut § 5101.58(G)(2)’s fifty percent presumption by demonstrating 
that a more limited allocation of damages to medical expenses is justified.  
3. Section 5101.58 Should be Amended Because § 5101.58(G)(2) is Fundamentally 
Unfair to Ohio Medicaid Recipients 
Not only should § 5101.58 be amended because it runs contrary to case and 
statutory law, it should also be amended because, as it currently stands, it is 
fundamentally unfair to Ohio Medicaid recipients whose settlements with liable third 
parties are not allocated. Section 5101.58(G)(2) is unfair to such Medicaid recipients 
because it entitles ODJFS to recover much more from their settlements than it would 
be entitled to recover if their settlements were allocated without any justifiable 
reason for the distinction. This unfairness is evident in Bates’ case, as he received a 
full $17,550.93 less than he would have if his settlement was allocated. Such a law, 
which bases the amount that a Medicaid recipient can ultimately recover from a 
settlement on an arbitrary technicality like allocation, so to speak kicks Ohio 
Medicaid recipients with unallocated settlements when they are down: they are 
already “the poorest Americans;”120 are injured; take settlements for significantly 
less than the true value of their claims; and then, for no justifiable reason, are forced 
to give more of that significantly reduced settlement to ODJFS than they would have 
if their settlements were allocated. This injustice is even more apparent considering 
that the current legal climate favors non-allocation.121  
Whether to facilitate “hyper-efficiency in practice” or to avoid confrontation with 
the opposing side based on the value of damages associated with each specific claim 
in the settlement, the tendency of personal injury lawyers today is “to plead damages 
in a general sense, frequently putting forward a laundry list of claims for relief” 
                                                           
 117 OKL. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 5051.1(D)(1)(d) (West 2012).  
 118 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 118E, § 22(c)-(d) (LexisNexis 2012). 
 119 HAW. REV. STAT. § 346-37(h). 
 120 See supra text accompanying note 24. Some Medicaid recipients, however, are not the 
poorest Americans to begin with, but, after having to pay their medical bills associated with 
their injuries, become so poor that they have to rely on Medicaid. Such was the case for both 
Ahlborn and Bates. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 273 (2006); 
Encompass Indem. Co. v. Bates, No. 11AP-1010, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3946, at *1 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2012). Nevertheless, the fact that they were not poor until their injuries 
does not take away from the argument that § 5101.58(G)(2) is fundamentally unfair.  
 121 Pearlman, supra note 14. 
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without actually allocating.122 Given this tendency, as well as the fact that § 5101.58 
does not require parties to allocate their settlements, a great deal of Ohio Medicaid 
recipients’ settlements will go unallocated, thereby forcing those recipients to assign 
to ODJFS much more of their settlement than they would have if their settlements 
were allocated for no justifiable reason.To avoid this injustice § 5101.58 must be 
amended to require the allocation of unallocated settlements before ODJFS may 
recover for medical expenses paid on behalf of Ohio Medicaid recipients.  
4. Amending § 5101.58 Would Be Consistent with the Public Policy in Favor of 
Settlements  
In addition to being highly unfair to Ohio Medicaid recipients with unallocated 
settlements, § 5101.58(G)(2) will also have the negative effect of deterring parties 
from settling their cases. Parties decide whether to settle or litigate by balancing the 
value of the settlement offer against the costs and risks of litigation.123 If the value of 
the settlement is greater than the costs and risks of litigation, parties will typically 
agree to settle.124 This balancing equation, however, is more difficult to apply in 
Medicaid third party liability cases because plaintiffs not only have to weigh the 
value of the settlement against the costs and risks of litigation, but they also have to 
take into consideration the fact that state Medicaid agencies will claim the right to a 
portion of their settlements as reimbursement for medical payments made on their 
behalf.  
Because § 5101.58(G)(2) gives ODJFS the right to either the entire amount of 
medical expenses it paid on behalf of Ohio Medicaid recipients or to half of 
recipients’ total settlement minus attorney’s fees and costs, the value of recipients’ 
settlements likely becomes significantly less than that to which they, like Bates and 
the appellants in Mulk, believe they are entitled. Once recipients are appraised of the 
possibility receiving such a significantly reduced settlement under § 5101.58(G)(2), 
they are likely to decide that the value of their settlement is no longer greater than 
the costs and risks associated with litigation, thereby having the effect of many cases 
resulting in trial rather than settlement. Thus, as it currently stands, Ohio’s Medicaid 
third party liability statute has the effect of disincentivizing Ohio Medicaid recipients 
from settling their cases.125  
This outcome, however, is contrary to the strong public policy in favor of 
settlements.126 Public policy favors settlements over litigation for a number of 
                                                           
 122 Id. at 18-20, 22.  
 123 Stephen Mcg. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System, 44 
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 12 (1992).  
 124 Id.  
 125 Cf. Brief for Ass’n of Trial Lawyers of Am. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (No. 04-1506) [hereinafter Trial Lawyers’ Brief] (“If this Court were 
to rule for petitioner, an injured plaintiff who had received medical treatment funded by 
Medicaid would have little incentive to settle her personal injury lawsuit for an amount that 
fell far short of her total claim for damages, because any settlement award immediately would 
be reduced by the total amount claimed by the state Medicaid agency for reimbursement of 
medical expenses paid. . . . Where the cost of treatment funded by Medicaid was substantial, 
there would be relatively little, if any money left to compensate plaintiff for her injuries.”).  
 126 Id. at 10 (“[The Supreme] Court has long recognized a strong public interest in the 
expeditious resolution of lawsuits through settlement.”); see also Margaret Meriwether 
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reasons;127 however, some of the most important reasons are ensuring the efficient 
resolution of lawsuits, easing the burden on the courts,128 and preserving limited 
judicial resources.129 To comply with this public policy and to meet these goals, 
therefore, § 5101.58 must be amended so that Ohio Medicaid recipients are not 
disincentivized from settling due to the law’s effect of significantly reducing the 
value of their settlements.  
Amending § 5101.58 to require allocation of unallocated settlements would 
eliminate that significant reduction in the value of Medicaid recipients’ settlements 
because if the recipients’ claims were allocated, ODJFS would only be able to 
recover from them that significantly limited amount that was intended to represent 
medical expenses. Therefore, by requiring allocation, Ohio Medicaid recipients will 
no longer be incentivized to forgo settlement based on the possibility that ODJFS 
will claim a significantly larger portion of their settlement than that to which they 
believe it is entitled. Thus, allocation would remedy the disincentivizing effect of the 
current law.  
IV. VARIOUS WAYS BY WHICH BOTH THE INTERESTS OF ODJFS AND OHIO 
MEDICAID RECIPIENTS CAN BE PROTECTED IN THE ALLOCATION PROCESS 
As discussed in Part III of this Note, to ensure compliance with Ahlborn, § 
5101.58(G)(2) must either be invalidated by the Ohio Supreme Court or repealed by 
the Ohio General Assembly. Part III of this Note also argued that § 5101.58 must be 
amended to require the allocation of unallocated settlements before ODJFS may 
recover any portion of Ohio Medicaid recipients’ settlements.  
This Section will address concerns that ODJFS may have with regard to such a 
statutory amendment and identify how those concerns can be mitigated. 
Additionally, this Section will discuss various ways by which Medicaid recipients’ 
settlements can be allocated and will argue that the best allocation method would be 
to require parties to negotiate an appropriate allocation themselves or if the parties 
reach an impasse, to have a court determine the allocation following an impartial 
hearing.  
                                                           
Cordray, Settlement Agreements and the Supreme Court, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 36, 38 (1996) 
(noting that the Supreme Court has endorsed the policy favoring settlements since the turn of 
the century by declaring that “settlements of matters in litigation, or in dispute, without 
recourse to litigation, are generally favored” (quoting St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. 
Mont. Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650, 656 (1898))). 
 127 Cordray, supra note 126, at 36-37. 
 128 Trial Lawyers’ Brief, supra note 125, at 10 (“Our state and federal judicial systems 
would cease to function if all, or even a substantial portion, of cases were litigated to trial.”). 
 129 Cordray, supra note 126, at 36 (“When parties resolve their dispute through settlement 
rather than full litigation, the growing pressure on court dockets is relieved. Settlement thus 
enables courts to conserve scarce judicial resources and to reduce their considerable backlog. 
Settlement is, as a result, ‘indispensable to judicial administration.’” (quoting Jannah v. GAF 
Corp., 887 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir. 1989))); see also Anne Knickerbocker, Annotation, Policy 
Encouraging and Favoring Compromise, 15B Am. Jur. 2d Compromise and Settlement § 3 
(2012) (“Generally, the law and public policy favor and encourage compromises and 
settlements as a means of resolving uncertainties and discouraging lawsuits. Settlement 
agreements simplify litigation without taking up valuable court resources, and reduce the 
burden on the courts. Accordingly, there is a strong judicial policy in favor of settlements.”). 
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A. Methods by Which ODJFS’ Interests Can be Protected in the Settlement 
Allocation Process 
Although Ohio Medicaid recipients, who will be able to retain more of their 
settlements than they would under § 5101.58(G)(2)’s current statutory cap 
formulation, will argue that an amendment to § 5101.58 is in their best interests, 
ODJFS will likely argue against the amendment for fear that Medicaid recipients 
will allocate only a small amount of damages to medical expenses, thereby 
“allocating away” most of ODJFS’ interest in the settlement. As discussed in Part 
III, such an allocation is necessary to ensure compliance with the federal anti-lien 
provision as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ahlborn; however, ODJFS’s 
interests in the allocation process can still be protected through the employment of 
various mitigation methods. In each of these methods, ODJFS must become 
intimately involved in the settlement allocation process.130  
ODJFS’ involvement in the settlement allocation process can be ensured through 
a variety of ways. One such way is to amend § 5101.58 to require the mandatory 
joinder of ODJFS to any claim in which a Medicaid lien is at issue.131 Alternatively, 
instead of making the joinder mandatory, § 5101.58 could be amended to require 
Medicaid recipients’ attorneys to notify ODJFS of any settlement negotiations, 
giving ODJFS the option to intervene and participate in the settlement negotiations if 
it so desires.132 Section 5101.58 could also be amended to require ODJFS’ consent 
before any allocation of damages is finalized by the parties.133 By requiring or 
allowing ODJFS to join the Medicaid recipients’ claims, or by requiring ODJFS to 
give its consent to any allocation by Medicaid recipients, ODJFS will be able to 
prevent Medicaid recipients from completely allocating away its interest.  
There are also more drastic ways in which ODJFS’ interest can be protected in 
the settlement allocation process. One such approach is to take the allocation 
decision away from all interested parties altogether, leaving the allocation decision 
solely within the discretion of the court.134 This approach would then ensure an 
impartial allocation for both parties. An even more drastic approach would be to 
eliminate the need for allocation altogether. This can be achieved by statutorily 
excluding medical expenses from Medicaid recipients’ personal injury settlements, 
thereby forcing ODJFS to initiate its own law suits against third parties liable for the 
                                                           
 130 See Arden, Memorandum, supra note 31 (“In order to protect the Medicaid program’s 
interest in the allocation of settlement monies to medical items and services it is extremely 
important for States to be involved in the litigation and settlement process.”). 
 131 See id. (“States may pass laws which require mandatory joinder of a State when a 
Medicaid lien is at issue. ”). Such a requirement is consistent with 42 U.S.C. § 2651(d), which 
gives the United States the right to join in any action that a Medicaid recipient has against a 
liable third party to enforce the state’s right to recovery of medical expenses paid on the 
recipient’s behalf. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2651(d) (West 2013). 
 132 Arden, Memorandum, supra note 31. 
 133 See Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 288 (2006) (“[T]he risk that 
parties to a tort suit will allocate away the State’s interest can be avoided . . . by obtaining the 
State’s advance agreement to an allocation.”). 
 134 Id.  
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medical expenses paid on behalf of Medicaid recipients.135 ODJFS would therefore 
completely avoid the risk of settlement manipulation by Medicaid recipients.  
B. Methods by Which Medicaid Recipients’ Settlements can be Allocated 
As the above discussion demonstrates, ODJFS’ interests in the settlement 
allocation process can be protected through a variety of mitigation methods. 
Therefore, this Note will now discuss the variety of ways in which Ohio Medicaid 
recipients’ settlements with liable third parties can be allocated.  
On one end of the spectrum, the Ohio General Assembly could amend § 5101.58 
to require that courts allocate unallocated settlements through an allocation hearing. 
Under this method, all interested parties, including ODJFS, would have the 
opportunity to be heard and then the court would use its discretion to make an 
objective determination of what would constitute a fair allocation based on the 
totality of the circumstances.136 This method would ensure that allocation is equitable 
for both Medicaid recipients and ODJFS.137 However, this method would also entail 
a considerable amount of time and expense, as courts would basically have to engage 
in mini-trials to determine appropriate allocations, thereby consuming already 
limited judicial resources and prolonging the final settlements.138  
On the other end of the spectrum, § 5101.58 could be amended to require the 
parties to allocate for medical expenses before the court would approve of any 
settlement. Such a pre-settlement allocation requirement would eliminate the waste 
of time and expense associated with post-settlement allocation hearings, as well as 
the reduce the potential for post-settlement appeals. This approach, however, could 
                                                           
 135 See J. Michael Hayes, Are Medicare, Medicaid, and ERISA Liens?, 79 N.Y. ST. B.J. 28, 
29-31 (2007).  
 136 See Wos v. E.M.A., 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1399 (2013) (holding that when an allocation 
cannot be reached by settlement agreement or stipulation, a judge or jury should make the 
allocation decision in a mini-trial); Trial Lawyers’ Brief, supra note 125, at 19-20; Henning v. 
Wineman, 306 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Minn. 1981) (deciding that the district court had the 
authority to allocate settlement proceeds among recoverable and non-recoverable damages); 
Rimes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 316 N.W.2d 348 (Wis. 1982) (upholding the trial 
court’s use of a post-settlement mini-trial to allocate proceeds); Sw. Fiduciary, Inc. v. Ariz. 
Health Care Cost Containment Sys. Admin., 249 P.3d 1104, 1111 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) 
(“When the proper allocation of the settlement amount to the damage component represented 
by [the state Medicaid agency] payments is disputed, the better course is to seek the 
intervention of the court.”); E.M.A v. Cansler, 674 F.3d 290, 312 (4th Cir. 2012) (“In the 
event of an unallocated lump-sum settlement exceeding the amount of the state’s Medicaid 
expenditures, as in this case, the sum certain allocable to medical expenses must be 
determined by way of a fair and impartial adversarial procedure.”). 
 137 See Harris v. City of New York, 837 N.Y.S.2d 486 (App. Div. 2007) (holding a hearing 
was necessary to determine the percentage of the settlement that should be allocated for 
medical expenses despite the fact that the plaintiff alleged the entire settlement award was for 
pain and suffering).  
 138 But see Wos, 133 S. Ct. at 1401 (In response to North Carolina’s argument that holding 
mini-trials would be “wasteful, time consuming, and costly,” the Court stated that “[e]ven if 
that were true, it would not relieve the State of its obligation to comply with the terms of the 
Medicaid anti-lien provision. And it is not true as a general proposition. . . . Sixteen States and 
the District of Columbia provide for hearings of this sort, and there is no indication that they 
have proved burdensome.”).  
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also prove problematic if parties cannot agree upon an appropriate allocation. If the 
parties are required to allocate before the court can approve a settlement and the 
parties cannot come to an allocation agreement, the case will be forced to proceed to 
trial, thereby violating the strong public policy favoring settlement.139  
Alternatively, and as Bates argued, § 5101.58 could be amended to require that 
the allocation decision be based solely on the Ahlborn formula. The Ahlborn formula 
divides the settlement amount by the alleged total original value of the claim and 
then multiplies that fraction by the total amount that ODJFS paid on behalf of the 
Medicaid recipient. The resulting value would be the appropriate amount allocated 
for medical expenses.140 Such an amendment would eliminate the time and expense 
associated with a mini trial, would eliminate the possibility of being forced to litigate 
if the parties cannot agree upon an appropriate allocation in the mandatory pre-
settlement allocation context, and would ensure an efficient resolution of the lawsuit. 
Such an amendment does, however, present a major drawback: Since the Ahlborn 
formula requires some determination of the original value of the claim, if the parties 
cannot agree upon this value, then they will be forced to turn to the court, which 
would then be forced to use its scarce resources and hold a mini trial to determine 
that value.141  
As this discussion illustrates, each of the above-proposed methods has both 
positive and negative characteristics. As such, some courts have instituted middle-
ground allocation methods in an attempt to capitalize on the positive characteristics 
and reduce the negative ones. Such courts have required that parties first attempt to 
allocate for medical expenses on their own, and then, if the parties cannot agree upon 
an appropriate allocation, these courts would either apply the Ahlborn formula142 or 
hold an allocation hearing143 to determine the appropriate allocation.  
C. Section 5101.58 Should be Amended to Require All Interested Parties to Attempt 
to Allocate, and if this Proves Impossible, Allocation Should be Court-Determined 
Keeping in mind that any allocation determination must consider both the 
interests of both Ohio Medicaid recipients and ODJFS, the best allocation method 
                                                           
 139 See supra Part III.B.4.  
 140 For example, in Bates’ case, $100,000 (his settlement value) would be divided by 
$500,000 (the alleged total value of his original claim), resulting in a fraction of one-fifth, 
which would then be multiplied by $67,245.37 (the amount ODJFS paid on his behalf). The 
resulting value, $13,449.07, would then be the appropriate allocation value. See also State 
Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Hudelson, 196 P.3d 905, 912 (Idaho 2008), abrogated by Verska 
v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 265 P.3d 502 (Idaho 2011). 
 141 See McKinney ex rel. Gage v. Phila. Hous. Auth., No. 07 Civ. 4432, 2010 WL 3364400, 
at *7 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
 142 See Hudelson, 196 P.3d at 912. 
 143 See In re E.B., 729 S.E.2d 270, 297 (W. Va. 2012) (“[A]ll reasonable efforts should be 
made to obtain the agreement of [the state Medicaid agency] regarding the allocation of the 
Medicaid recipient’s past medical expenses after a settlement has been obtained. However, if 
judicial allocation becomes necessary, the trial court is required to hold an evidentiary 
damages hearing.”); Bolanos v. Super. Ct., 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 174, 180 (Ct. App. 2008) (“If 
there is no settlement allocation, as in a settlement, the parties must attempt to allocate; if they 
cannot agree, they must turn to the court.”).  
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for the State of Ohio is the middle-ground approach advocated in In re E.B. and 
Bolanos.144 Thus, the legislature should amend § 5101.58 to require that parties first 
attempt to agree upon an appropriate allocation of the settlement, and if agreement is 
impossible to achieve, the court should then hold an allocation hearing in which all 
interested parties can produce evidence to establish the value that they believe 
appropriately represents medical damages.  
In such allocation hearings, courts should use the Ahlborn formula as a starting 
point, but should also consider all of the evidence proffered by the interested parties 
before making a final allocation decision. For example, courts should hear the 
evidence proffered by the parties to confirm the true value of recipients’ original 
claims before they apply that value to the Ahlborn formula. Such a confirmation 
would ensure that recipients are not exaggerating the true value of their claims, 
thereby ensuring an equitable allocation for ODJFS. Courts should also consider 
recipients’ injuries145 and how they compare to verdicts in similar cases.146 Finally, 
courts should consider the likelihood that recipients would prevail on their claims, as 
well as how much they would reasonably expect to recover if they were to prevail to 
ensure that the final allocation of medical damages is objectively reasonable for both 
recipients and ODJFS.147  
To further ensure a fair allocation, and to mitigate any potential negative 
consequences associated with mandatory allocation, § 5101.58 must be amended to 
require the mandatory joinder of ODJFS to Medicaid recipients’ actions. Such a 
mandatory joinder will ensure that recipients and liable third parties will not allocate 
away ODJFS’ interest in the settlement, and if the parties cannot agree on an 
allocation on their own, will ensure that ODJFS’ interests are properly represented in 
any judicial allocation hearing.  
In sum, amending § 5101.58 to require allocation of unallocated settlements 
ensures that ODJFS’ recovery will be limited to the portion of Ohio Medicaid 
recipients’ settlements that was intended to represent medical expenses, thereby 
allowing the recipients to keep a greater portion of their settlements than they would 
                                                           
 144 See In re E.B., 729 S.E.2d at 297; see Bolanos, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 180. 
 145 Based on the recipient’s injuries, the court might even determine that the Ahlborn 
formula would not be appropriate to use at all. See Bolanos, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 181 (“[T]here 
are cases when the assumption of the Ahlborn formula may not apply, i.e., the settlement may 
not be driven primarily by past medical expenses. Such cases are those involving catastrophic 
injuries to children, where the cost of future medical care, perhaps extending over a lifetime, 
is the largest factor in the settlement.”). 
 146 See Lugo v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 819 N.Y.S.2d 892, 897-98 (App. Div. 2006) (“A 
court determination is necessary to confirm the full value of the case and the value of the 
various items of damages, including the plaintiff’s injuries and how they compare to verdicts 
awarded in other cases.”). 
 147 See Wos v. E.M.A., 133 S. Ct. 1400 (2013) (“What portion of [the] lump sum 
settlement constitutes ‘fair and just compensation’ for each individual claim will depend both 
on how likely [the Medicaid recipient] would have been to prevail on the claims at trial and 
how much they reasonably could have expected to receive on each claim if successful, in view 
of damages awarded in comparable tort cases.”); McKinney ex rel. Gage v. Phila. Hous. 
Auth., No. 07 Civ. 4432, 2010 WL 3364400, at *12 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (“[T]he court has 
considered the risks and uncertainties Plaintiffs faced in prevailing on their underlying claim 
and their probability of recovering past medical expenses in particular.”). 
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under the current § 5101.58(G)(2). Amending § 5101.58 to require the mandatory 
joinder of ODJFS to Medicaid recipients’ actions against liable third parties will also 
ensure that ODJFS’ interests in the allocation process are protected. Amending § 
5101.58 to require that ODJFS, the recipient, and the third party attempt to come to 
an agreement on an appropriate allocation will furthermore ensure a swift resolution 
of the lawsuit, as well as ensure that scarce judicial resources are not unnecessarily 
consumed.148 Finally, by amending § 5101.58 to allow for a judicial allocation 
hearing if parties fail to agree on an appropriate allocation, the parties will avoid 
having to proceed to a full trial and will be assured of an objective and fair 
allocation. Such amendments would therefore ensure that the interests of all the 
parties, as well as the interest of the judicial system, are considered and safeguarded. 
 V. CONCLUSION  
In Ahlborn, the unanimous Supreme Court was exceedingly clear in that the 
language of the federal Medicaid third party liability provisions stipulates that state 
Medicaid agencies may only be assigned the right to the portion of a Medicaid 
recipient’s settlement that represents damages for medical expenses. While the Ohio 
Tenth District Court of Appeals held that § 5101.58(G)(2) satisfies this standard, the 
court’s reasoning is flawed in multiple respects.  
First of all, § 5101.58(G)(2) fails to ensure, as Ahlborn requires, that ODJFS’ 
recovery is properly limited to the portion of Medicaid recipients’ settlements that 
actually represents medical damages. Secondly, § 5101.58(G)(2) creates the likely 
possibility that any ODJFS recovery will in fact violate the federal anti-lien 
provisions, which would therefore violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution. Finally, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Ahlborn simply does not 
support the Tenth District’s justification for upholding § 5101.58(G)(2). The Ohio 
Supreme Court must therefore invalidate § 5101.58(G)(2) upon appeal of Bates or, if 
no appeal is made or granted, the Ohio General Assembly must repeal it.  
Furthermore, to ensure compliance with Ahlborn and the federal anti-lien 
provisions, § 5101.58 must be amended to require the allocation of unallocated 
settlements before ODJFS may recover for medical expenses paid on behalf of 
Medicaid recipients. Such an amendment is supported by the fact that the majority of 
courts, and in particular the United States Supreme Court in Wos, that have heard 
cases pertaining to statutory caps post-Ahlborn have invalidated the caps and have 
required settlement allocation, or at the very least required that Medicaid recipients 
be given the opportunity to rebut statutory cap presumptions. Amending § 5101.58 
to require allocation is further supported by the actions of the multiple state 
legislatures that amended their Medicaid third party liability statutes to require 
settlement allocation post-Ahlborn, as well as supported by principles of fairness to 
the Medicaid recipient and the strong public policy in favor of settlements.  
As the interests of both Ohio Medicaid recipients and ODJFS must be protected 
in such mandatory allocations, § 5101.58 must be amended to require that ODJFS 
join any action in which a Medicaid lien is at issue. Then, to ensure a swift 
                                                           
 148 As the Trial Lawyers’ Brief noted, once a procedure for an allocation hearing is 
established, it is rarely used and parties are typically able to agree to an allocation without the 
need for the time and expense of an allocation hearing. Therefore, requiring parties to 
negotiate an allocation at first will likely save vast amounts of judicial resources. Trial 
Lawer’s Brief, supra, note 125, at 21.  
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resolution of the lawsuit and to ensure that judicial resources are not unnecessarily 
wasted, § 5101.58 must also be amended to require that the parties attempt to agree 
upon an appropriate allocation themselves. To avoid having to resort to litigation if 
the parties fail to agree upon a proper allocation, however, § 5101.58 must allow the 
court to hold an allocation hearing where the Ahlborn formula and all of the 
evidence proffered by the parties would be considered to determine an allocation that 
would be fair to both Ohio Medicaid recipients and ODJFS.  
Such amendments to § 5101.58 will ensure ODJFS’ compliance with the federal 
anti-lien provisions as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ahlborn, as well as 
ensure that liable third parties will appropriately compensate both Ohio Medicaid 
recipients and ODJFS. Accordingly, to prevent violations of the federal anti-lien 
provisions, and to protect the interests of Ohio Medicaid recipients and ODJFS, the 
Ohio General Assembly must implement these amendments as soon as possible.  
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